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BA  Benefits Agency  
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ES  Employment Service  
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NDLP  New Deal for Lone Parents 
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OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ONS  Office for National Statistics 
PA  Personal Adviser 
SSAC  Social Security Advisory Committee 
UK  United Kingdom 
WBLA  Work Based Learning for Adults 
WFI  Work Focused Interview  
WFTC  Working Families Tax Credit 
WTC   Working Tax Credit 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the past decade there has been radical change in the British welfare state. The 
Government has introduced a new welfare contract where the ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
of working age adults receiving state benefits have been redefined to encourage, and 
increasingly require, their active participation in paid employment. This has involved a 
parallel ‘activation’ of entitlements and obligations and of the services delivered by 
welfare state institutions.  
 
This chapter considers the new combinations of job search assistance, obligations and 
programmes; and ‘make work pay’ reforms, introduced in Great Britain (GB) since 
19972. It assesses evidence on the impacts of the strategy and the challenges faced as 
activation requirements are extended to workless lone parents and people with health 
problems and disabilities. 
 
The British case merits attention for several reasons. Firstly, New Labour has sought 
explicitly to synthesise ‘what works’ from both neo-liberal and social democratic welfare 
traditions with some analysts discerning the emergence of an “Anglo-social welfare 
model, incorporating and reconciling economic performance and flexibility with equality 
and social justice” (Dixon and Pearce, 2005, p. 81).  
 
Secondly, the persistent high levels of unemployment that characterised Britain in the 
1980s and early 1990s have been replaced by low levels of unemployment and high 
levels of labour force participation. Credit for the success of the British strategy has been 
attributed to labour market flexibility and adept macro economic management. This 
chapter more narrowly considers the particular contribution made by activation and 
redistribution through the tax and benefit system. 
 
2 The legal foundation and governance of the British Welfare State 
 
It is important to clarify some distinguishing characteristics of the British political, 
administrative and constitutional system that in part facilitated the early emergence of 
‘activation’.  
 
In contrast to most European countries GB has no single constitutional document. The 
British constitution consists of laws, customs and conventions, drawn from both legal and 
non-legal sources and its common law has developed with an emphasis on remedies 
rather than rights. 
 
British social security law is based on legislation consisting of Acts of Parliament and 
statutory instruments. Individual Acts typically give Ministers the power to introduce 
secondary legislation in the form of detailed regulations. These statutory instruments 
                                                 
2 Job search activity obligations and the benefit, tax and tax credit system are uniform throughout the four 
countries that make up the UK. The remit of DWP and Jobcentre Plus, which are responsible for the 
implementation of activation, extends only across GB and not Northern Ireland which has a different 
administrative architecture.  
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must be approved by Parliament but are not subject to the full process of Parliamentary 
debate and scrutiny applied to the initial primary legislation. Many detailed issues 
concerning job search requirements and social security entitlements are implemented and 
revised through such secondary legislation. 
 
A second source of social security law derives from judicial decisions, made in this 
context principally by Social Security Commissioners who preside over appeal tribunals. 
These administrative tribunals were first created in 1911 to resolve disputes about benefit 
eligibility or sanctions independently from Ministers and outside the formal law courts. 
In the British social security (and the tax and tax credits) system there is a statutory right 
of appeal to a tribunal “against decisions on entitlement which turn on matters of fact, but 
no appeal against the use of discretion” (PAC, 2006, p.5).  Judicial decisions by Social 
Security Commissioners provide binding interpretations of the legislation and must 
subsequently be followed by tribunals and local ‘decision makers’ in JCP. Both reported 
and unreported decisions of Commissioners are important sources of guidance on the 
interpretation and application of legislation.  
 
The governance of the British benefit system is also highly centralised.  In the absence of 
a written constitution and fewer restraints on the executive the Government has an 
enhanced capacity to redesign benefits, create organisations and mould institutions to 
meet its policy objectives. In contrast with other European countries the National 
Insurance (NI) system is controlled directly by the state, not the social partners, and there 
are no independent social insurance funds. The design and delivery of benefits for British 
citizens outside the insurance system is also largely centralised and unlike many 
European systems local municipalities play a limited role in the delivery of benefits and 
employment programmes.  Ministers and senior civil servants control the main levers of 
economic and employment policy and control implementation through central 
Government Departments and since the late 1980s their respective Executive Agencies.  
 
3. The Benefit  System for Working Age People 
 
In 1911 the British Government was the first to introduce a nationally regulated system of 
unemployment insurance jointly funded by workers and employers (Price, 2000). This 
was intended to free important sections of the labour force from recourse to traditional 
Poor Law ‘relief’ and through local ‘labour exchanges’ facilitate the placement and 
filling of job vacancies. There was, however, concern about the impact that 
unemployment benefits would have on labour discipline leading to the parallel 
introduction of strict rules and procedures to deter people from leaving jobs and for 
testing their availability for work. The way in which benefit entitlements and obligations 
were subsequently institutionalised, underpinned the “resilience of liberal values” in the 
British system explaining the relative ease with which such values were to come to 
prominence again in the 1980s (King, 1995, p. xiv).  
 
3.1 Main Cash Benefits for People of Working Age  
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The structure of the British benefit system was first modernised following the Beveridge 
Report of 1942. This led to the introduction of a NI system made up mainly of employer 
and employee contributions paying flat-rate benefits, covering risks such as 
unemployment, invalidity from work and retirement. The system also contributed 
towards an, in principle, universal and free National Health Service. A residual means-
tested National Assistance system was designed to provide for those who did not qualify 
for insurance benefits. Family allowances were introduced also to ensure, amongst other 
things, that the costs of rearing children would not discourage people from taking up low 
paid jobs. Finally, in this period Government accepted a responsibility to maintain full 
employment through Keynesian demand-oriented policies.  
 
The British social security system has since been characterised by a two track system of 
benefits: one contributory scheme for the insured and a parallel means tested scheme for 
those who exhaust or never attain entitlement. Contributory insurance benefits cover the 
traditional risks of unemployment, sickness, pregnancy, invalidity, industrial injuries (i.e. 
accidents at work) and occupational disease, old age and death. Currently they include 
contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Incapacity Benefit (IB), Maternity 
Allowance, Industrial Injuries Benefits, and Old Age Pension. Entitlement to each of 
these benefits depends upon satisfying the relevant tests governing payment of NI 
contributions.  
 
Means-tested benefits are available to people whose income falls below a certain level, 
which varies according to their family circumstances. Entitlement also depends upon the 
level of the person’s assets. Currently the most significant include Income Support (IS), 
income-based JSA, Housing Benefit (HB), Council Tax Benefit (CTB), Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC). Legal entitlement depends on presence, and, 
in the case of some means-tested benefits, habitual residence. Other non-contributory 
benefits are designed for the risk of old age and death, and for specific categories of 
people who are not covered by the insurance system. They include Attendance 
Allowance, Disability Living Allowance and non-contributory retirement pensions. 
 
The design of individual benefits and the determination of their eligibility rules are 
governed through detailed regulations. The level and duration of benefits are set annually 
by central Government and increases are based on price indexation rather than average 
earnings.  
 
Figure 1 gives a brief description of the main working age benefits in 2007.  
 
Figure 1: Cash Benefits for Workless People in Britain 
Jobseekers Allowance: JSA is a benefit for unemployed people aged under state pension age and 
who are capable of, available for and actively seeking work of at least 40 hours per week. It may 
be claimed by people working less than 16 hours a week who are looking for full time work. 
There are two types of JSA. Contribution based JSA is a flat rate cash benefit paid for six months 
to individuals who have been employed and paid enough NI contributions in the preceding two 
years. There are different levels of cash payment for young people aged under 25 and an 
additional payment for a domestic partner. Income based JSA is available for low income 
unemployed people and their families if they satisfy the same income and assets test applied to 
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those who claim IS. 
 
Income Support: An income related cash benefit that can be claimed by people normally aged 18 
and over who have insufficient income to meet their needs and savings below £16,000. IS 
comprises a personal allowance for the claimant, partner and any children; premiums for families 
with children, people with disabilities, and carers; plus help with some housing costs such as 
mortgage interest payments. In February 2006, 2.13 million people received IS. Roughly 56% 
were disabled and 36% lone parents. 
 
Incapacity Benefit: A contribution based cash payment paid to people who are incapable of work 
who have paid, or been credited with, sufficient NI contributions.  It may also be claimed by 
people who become incapable of work in their youth. An employed person is entitled to at least 
‘Statutory Sick Pay’ for the first 28 weeks of their incapacity for work after which they may 
claim IB. Incapacity is assessed through an ‘Own Occupation Test’ and  ‘Personal Capability 
Assessment’. There are three levels of cash payment, increasing in value with time on benefit.  
Generally IB it is not affected by savings or other income. If someone has not paid enough NI 
contributions to qualify for IB they may, if eligible, claim IS and receive a disability premium. 
 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit: HB was introduced in 1980 following deregulation 
of the housing market and removal of rent controls. Council Tax is a tax on domestic property 
values and the main source of revenue income for Local Authorities. Each dwelling is allocated to 
one of eight valuation bands, based on its capital value. Both HB and CTB are paid to qualifying 
low income people whether or not the claimant is available for or in full-time work and are 
administered and paid by 408 Local Authorities. The rules are, however, determined by central 
Government.  HB and CTB are subject to the same detailed rules and payments vary by family 
size, income and savings. In 2006 just over 4 million people in GB were in receipt of HB and 5.8 
million households received CTB (Hansard, , 8 May 2007, col. 178W). 
 
National Insurance Credits: NI ‘Credits’ are awarded to people who are out of work and 
claiming benefits in order to maintain their eligibility for a state pension. A significant minority 
of people who receive no cash benefit are awarded NI Credits through the JSA and IB systems. 
 
Other Benefits:  There are other cash benefits paid to help with the mobility or care costs of 
disability, a ‘Social Fund’ for emergency payments, assistance with prescription and dental 
charges and, for children, school meals. Certain groups, such as the carers of disabled people, 
may be entitled to a specific cash benefit.
 
3.2 Trends in Benefit Expenditure  
 
After 1945 social security spending increased almost continuously as a share of national 
income until the 1980s. This was due to an increase in the generosity of many state 
benefits as well as an increase in the numbers eligible to claim them. This trend 
accelerated when unemployment increased. For example the number of people claiming 
unemployment benefits increased  from 340,000 in 1950 to over 1.6 million in 1980 
(Phillips and Sibieta, 2006, p. 48).  
 
The late 1980s saw the first substantial fall in social security spending due to falling 
unemployment and reforms, in particular the decision to increase benefits in line with 
prices, not earnings. The economic downturn in the early 1990s, however, saw the 
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economy contract and unemployment rise to 2.9 million. This led to another increase in 
expenditure. Social security again fell as a share of GDP as the economy grew and 
unemployment fell. This trend changed in 2000 and the proportion of GDP allocated to 
social security expenditure has increased, mainly due to the generosity of benefits 
targeted at pensioners and families with children. 
 
In 2005/06, about £140.6 billion was spent on social security benefits in GB accounting 
for 26.9% of total government expenditure. Approximately 30 million people in the UK – 
over half the total population – receive income from at least one social security benefit 
(ibid, p. 1). The largest group of beneficiaries are over state pension age but about a third 
of social security expenditure is claimed by people of working age.  
 
JSA claimant unemployment fell significantly after 1993 but the number of people of 
working age receiving state benefits has remained high.  Figure 2 shows the changing 
composition of the population of people on working age benefits since 1979. It illustrates 
the impact of two recessions alongside the gradual increase in those claiming benefits 
either because they were lone parents or, more significantly, because of disability or other 
health problems.  
 
Figure 2: UK Main Working Age Benefit Caseloads: 1979-2007 
 
Source: Presentation on ‘Repeat benefit claimants and long term unemployment’, Bill Wells, Chief 
Economist,  Department for Work and Pensions, at the Welfare Reform: Challenges, Choices and 
International Insights, DWP International Conference, 26 March, 2007, London. 
 
An important feature of change in the British benefit system has been the shift away from 
insurance based contributory benefits. Contributory benefits now account for less than 
55% of total benefit expenditure, compared to 70% in the 1960s; and income-related 
benefits have grown from 8% of overall expenditure in the 1960s to 31% in 2006/07 
(Tetteh, 2007, p. 42). In the British system the link between the amount contributed and 
benefit entitlement, which was once close, has now weakened. 
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This trend has been most marked in unemployment benefits where the proportion 
receiving insurance-based contributory payments declined sharply in the 1980s, a trend 
that has continued under New Labour. Table 1 shows, however, a slight increase in the 
proportion receiving contribution based JSA in 2005 reflecting an increase in short term 
unemployment. 
 
Table 1: Contribution and Income-Based JSA Claimants (GB.; as at May; 
Thousands) 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
All with benefit - 
total 
1 105.8 (100%) 
 
976.2 854.5 828.0 835.8 738.0 768.5 (100%) 
Contribution-based 
JSA only 
158.2 (14%)  148.8 148.1 162.7 168.0 138.2 147.2 (19%) 
Contribution based 
JSA & income-based 
JSA 
27.1 (2%)  19.0 18.4 19.4 19.0 14.2 14.2 (2%) 
Income-based JSA 
only payment 
920.4 (83%)  808.4 688.1 645.9 648.8 585.6 607.1 (79%) 
No benefit in 
payment* 
118.7  
 
95.0 94.4 91.1 92.0 82.1 76.4 
Total 1 224.5  1 071.2 948.9 919.2 927.8 820.1 844.9 
* Some people continue to claim JSA after 6 months even though they are not qualified for income based 
JSA in order to obtain NI ‘credits’. 
Source: Table 10.6, Annual Abstract of Statistics: 2006 Edition, National Statistics, Palgrave, Basingstoke.  
 
4.    Activation Policies 
 
4.1 Benefit Reform and Activation in the Conservative Era 
 
A new approach to ‘activation’ first emerged in the British benefit system in the mid-
1980s. What became apparent at this time was that at each turn of the economic cycle 
long term unemployment had been ‘ratcheting’ upwards. In the late 1960s, for example, 
the proportion of those unemployed for over a year averaged 17%, by the mid 1980s it 
increased to 40%. The ‘risk’ of unemployment had increased only slightly but it had 
become “a much more serious event because it takes so much longer, on average, to get 
back into work” (Nickell, 1999, p. 22). After the introduction of the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) in 1984  it was found that the number of people receiving unemployment benefits 
exceeded those who said they were actively looking for work.  
 
Critics pointed to the lax implementation of benefit conditionality and to institutional 
fragmentation. Individuals who claimed unemployment benefits did so at Unemployment 
Benefit Offices, where they were also required to ‘sign on’ fortnightly as available for 
work. These offices were controlled directly by the Department of Employment. By 
contrast job matching took place at recently established ‘high street’ Jobcentres and these 
were controlled by a tripartite Manpower Services Commission (MSC) that was 
responsible for overall training and ‘manpower policy’. It was argued that different 
organisational priorities meant that the management of the system had become “passive”, 
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job matching was not linked to receipt of benefit, and that the unemployed had “no 
responsibilities to counterbalance the right to benefit” (Wells, 2001, p. 248).  
 
By the late 1980s, the Conservative Government had embarked on a series of reforms to 
the benefit system and to active labour market programmes. The objective was to 
improve the ‘supply-side’, by ‘activating’ the unemployed and getting them into available 
jobs as soon as possible rather than putting them ‘on hold’ in large scale employment and 
training programmes.  
 
The 1989 a Social Security Act introduced ‘actively seeking work’ regulations that 
required the unemployed to take at least two different steps each week to find 
employment.  The unemployed lost the right to reject a job for not paying a ‘recognised’ 
rate of pay and sanctions for ‘voluntary unemployment’ increased. These changes 
complemented policies that deregulated wages and employment conditions in much of 
the British labour market and which culminated in 1993 in the abolition of all statutory 
minimum wage protection (except in agriculture). 
 
The activation strategy was supplemented by implementation reforms. In 1987 the MSC 
was stripped of its role in delivering services directly to the unemployed and a new 
Employment Service Executive Agency was created with the task of integrating the 
previously separate networks of front line offices. 
 
The Employment Service (ES) was ‘steered’ directly by Ministers through performance 
targets focused in particular on job placement, reducing fraud and the numbers claiming 
benefit, and the delivery of job search programmes.  The ES was made responsible both 
for the administration of benefit payments and for job search advice, scrutiny and 
vacancy matching. It was responsible also for encouraging claimants to take advantage of 
‘in-work’ social security benefits if they took low paid jobs.3 These services were by 
1989 delivered through a newly integrated national network of front line Jobcentres.  
 
By the mid-1990s, unemployed people were subject to what was called the ‘stricter’ 
benefit regime. This consisted of an in depth initial interview and fortnightly checks of 
job search activity throughout a claim. After 13 weeks the unemployed person was 
expected to expand the range of jobs they were willing to accept and after 26 weeks, the 
claimant had to attend their first in depth ‘Restart’ interview, thereafter repeated every six 
months. These regular administrative interventions were designed to reduce ‘duration 
dependency’, the “natural tendency for morale and job search to flag the longer a person 
is unemployed” (Wells, 2001, p. 247). 
 
This process of activation culminated in the 1995 Jobseekers Act. Unemployed 
individuals were now required to enter a mandatory Jobseekers Agreement (JSAg) 
specifying the steps they intended to take to look for work. Front line officials were given 
                                                 
3 The key in-work benefits included Housing and Council Tax Benefit (see Figure 1) but there was also a  
significant expansion of Family Credit, which directly supplemented the wages of workers with dependent 
children and which by 1996 was being received by over 600,000 families, many of which were headed by 
lone parents (see Figure 5). 
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a new discretionary power enabling them to issue a ‘Jobseekers Direction’ requiring an 
individual to look for work in a particular way, to take other steps to ‘improve their 
employability’ or to participate in job search programmes or training schemes.. Figure 3 
contrasts some of the main differences between benefits for the unemployed before 1996 
and after the introduction of JSA.  
 
Figure 3: Significant differences between Unemployment Benefit and Income 
Support for the Unemployed (pre 1996) and Jobseekers Allowance (since 1996) 
 
 Unemployment 
Benefit 
Income Support JSA (contribution 
based) 
JSA (income based 
Availability for 
work 
Be available 
every day 
claimed. 
Be available for at 
least 24 hours a 
week. 
 
Be available for at least 40 hours work a week and 
after 13 weeks be willing to travel at least 90 
minutes to work each way*. Certain groups e.g. 
carers or those with a physical or mental condition 
can restrict their availability to less than 40 hours 
depending on personal circumstances. 
Actively 
seeking work 
Actively seeking 
work every week. 
 
Actively seeking 
work every week. 
 
Actively seek work every week by applying for jobs 
or improving employment prospects. Expected to 
take three different ‘steps’ to look for work each 
week**. Not entitled when behaviour stops them 
getting a job. 
Jobseeker's 
Agreement 
 
Voluntary Back 
to Work Plan. 
Voluntary Back to 
Work Plan. 
Enter into and sign a Jobseeker's Agreement as a 
condition of benefit. The Agreement sets out the 
jobseeker’s agreed availability, the steps the 
jobseeker intends to take to look for work, and  the 
range of help available to find work. 
Duration  
 
6 days a week for 
up to 312 days. 
7 days a week. 
Indefinite award. 
 
Weekly benefit up to a 
maximum of 182 days.  
Weekly benefit paid 
while circumstances 
remain unchanged. 
Labour market 
disallowances 
Disallowed if fail 
to be available 
for/actively 
seeking work. 
Hardship payable if 
unavailable, both 
pending decision and 
if decision is adverse. 
No hardship payable 
if not actively 
seeking work. 
Disallowed if fail to be 
available for/actively 
seeking work/ have not 
signed a satisfactory 
Jobseeker's Agreement. 
 
Access to reduced rate in 
case of hardship for 
people in prescribed 
vulnerable groups 
pending decision and 
following adverse 
decision. People not in 
prescribed groups have 
access from the third 
week only where doubt 
over entitlement to JSA; 
but no access where 
adverse decision reached. 
Sanctions  Disqualification 
for up to 26 
weeks for leaving 
voluntarily, 
misconduct, 
refusal of 
employment and 
IS automatically 
reduced by 40% of 
personal allowance 
both pending decision 
and following 
adverse decision on 
leaving voluntarily, 
Disqualification for up 
to 26 weeks for leaving 
voluntarily, 
misconduct, refusal of 
employment. Loss of 
benefit for 2 weeks (4 
if repeated) for refusal 
Access to reduced rate 
only in case of hardship: 
but not during first 2 
weeks of a standard 
sanction or throughout a 
New Deal sanction, 
except for people in 
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refusal of 
training. No UB 
payable pending 
decision on first 
two categories. 
misconduct and 
refusal of 
employment. 
 
of training scheme or 
employment. 
programme, refusal to 
carry out Jobseeker's 
Direction. 
prescribed vulnerable 
groups. 
 
* Increased from one hour each way in 2004. 
** Increased from two steps in 2004. 
Source: Job Seeker’s Allowance Quarterly Statistical Enquiry: February 2005, Annex 5, Department for 
Work and Pensions (at www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/jsa/jsa_quarterly_feb05.asp). 
 
4.2 New Labour’s Inheritance: Falling Unemployment and Increasing 
 Benefit Dependency 
 
By 1996/97 the active benefit regime was contributing to a general decline in 
unemployment (Sweeney and McMahon, 1998). The welfare state that New Labour 
inherited in 1997 was, however, under pressure. The reduction in unemployment masked 
the emergence of deep-seated problems. In particular, earnings inequality had increased 
and pay levels for the unskilled had fallen, leading to a substantial degree of in work 
poverty, particularly among families with young children. Inter-generational 
unemployment blighted many disadvantaged areas and in one in five UK households 
nobody of working age had a job. By 1996 nearly a million lone parents, mainly women 
were dependent on state benefits.  
 
Economic activity rates were static and had fallen for older men. Many of those who lost 
jobs in the waves of restructuring that took place in manufacturing and other sectors 
moved on to sickness and disability benefits, contributing to what was described as 
‘hidden unemployment’ (Alcock et al, 2003). A number of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors were 
identified. ‘Push factors’ included the collapse in demand for unskilled labour, the role of 
the activation regime and the relative laxity of medical and eligibility tests. ‘Pull factors’ 
included the relative generosity of invalidity compared with unemployment benefits 
(Clasen et al, 2004, p. 22). Other factors were also at work, especially an increase in 
qualifying mental health conditions. 
 
What was common to both those claiming lone parent and disability benefits was that 
while the flow into these benefits was relatively steady the average duration of such 
benefit claims increased. There were no work requirements for those on ‘inactive’ 
benefits and most who claimed them had little contact with employment related services. 
 
4.3 Activation under New Labour: A ‘New Contract for Welfare’ 
 
In his first major domestic speech Prime Minister Blair stated that the “greatest 
challenge” for his “welfare to work” Government was “to refashion our institutions to 
bring the new workless class back into society and into useful work” (PM, 1997). The 
Labour Government commenced a programme of radical change. The first steps involved 
the introduction of ‘New Deal’ employment programmes alongside a National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) and changes to the tax and benefit system to ‘make work pay’. In 1998 the 
Government proposed a ‘new contract for welfare’. The ambition was to rebuild the 
welfare system “around the principle of work for those who can and security for those 
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who cannot” (DSS, 1998, p. iii). The ambition was to change “the whole culture of the 
benefit system” through introducing a “single gateway to work” where Personal Advisers 
(PAs) would help “people to become independent, rather than (lock) them into 
dependency” (ibid, p. 9).  
 
The reform process has since sought to activate both individual claimants and the 
institutions delivering benefits and employment programmes. In 2001 a national 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) was created with Jobcentre Plus (JCP), an 
Executive Agency made responsible for integrating job search support and benefit 
payments for all working age people. The 1999 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 
introduced mandatory ‘Work Focused Interviews’ (WFIs) for all working age claimants 
and Ministers have since extended the frequency with which certain groups have to 
attend them. In 2008 major changes will further ‘activate’ benefits for people with health 
problems or disabilities and work obligations are likely to be extended to lone parents. 
 
The following sections describe in more detail the key components of the ‘active’ welfare 
state constructed by New Labour. The sections consider in turn: 
 
• The replacement rate of JSA and ‘make work pay’ reforms; 
• Activation requirements and sanctions;  
• Employment programmes and the New Deal; and 
• The governance and delivery of the new system, especially the role of private and 
voluntary sector providers. 
 
Finally the chapter assesses trends in unemployment and economic activity and considers 
the evidence available on the impacts of the reforms introduced.  
 
4.3.1   ‘Making Work Pay’:  The NMW and Working Tax Credits 
 
The level of British benefits for the unemployed is low relative to previous earnings, a 
characteristic of a liberal welfare regime. The OECD summary measure of benefit 
entitlements shows the British wage replacement rate falling from 24% to 18% between 
1979 and 1995 and declining to 16% in 2003, at which point it was amongst the lowest in 
Europe (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives ). By 2005 the level of JSA payment 
for a couple aged over 25 represented just over 17% of the average wage and that for a 
single person under 25 less than 11% (see Table 2).  
 
The value of the main means-tested benefits relative to average earnings has, however, 
changed significantly. There has been an improvement in the position of larger families 
with children and for pensioners, as shown in Figure 4, reflecting the Government’s 
commitment to tackle child and pensioner poverty. By contrast unemployed single people 
and childless couples have experienced a 20% decline in the value of their benefit relative 
to average earnings since 1997 (Palmer et al, 2006, Table 6A). The Government argues 
that this change has sharpened work incentives and targeted extra income at those groups 
least able to improve their position through employment.  
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Table 2: Jobseeker's Allowance (contribution based) at April 2005 Prices and as a 
percentage of Average Earnings (1997, 2001, 2005) 
  Single person aged over 25   Couple aged over 25 
Date of 
uprating 
Rate of 
JSA  
£pw 
 
Real value 
of JSA at 
date of 
uprating 
£pw at April 
2005 prices 
Rate as a 
percentage 
of average 
earnings 
%age  
 
Rate of 
JSA  
£pw 
 
Real value 
of JSA at 
date of 
uprating 
£pw at April 
2005 prices 
Rate as a 
percentage 
of average 
earnings 
%age  
 
April 1997 49.15 60.25 13.4 77.15 94.57 21.0 
April 2001 53.05 58.72 11.8 83.25 92.15 18.5 
April 2005 56.20 56.20 10.9 88.15 88.15 17.1 
Source: The Abstract of Statistics for Benefits, National Insurance Contributions, and Indices of Prices and 
Earnings: 2005 Edition, National Statistics, London, 2006, Table 5.3  
 
Figure 4: Level of Income Support* Relative to Average Earnings: 1997-2006 
 
 
* Income Tested JSA paid at same rate as IS 
Source: Palmer G., MacInnes T. and Kenway P. (2006) Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2006, 
Indicator 6A, New Policy Institute and Joseph Rowntree Foundation, London. 
 
More positive work incentives have been introduced also to ‘make work pay’. In 1998 
the NMW Act established an independent statutory Low Pay Commission to make 
recommendations about the level and operation of a minimum wage. The legislation 
established a single national hourly rate to cover all mature workers, except the self 
employed. The only exception is younger people and trainees who can be paid a lower 
development rate.  
 
The NMW has been increased annually since 1999 and, in the absence of adverse impacts 
on employment or inflation, the rate has been increased faster than average earnings since 
2003 (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: National Minimum Hourly Wage Rates: 1999 to 2006 
Date 
With effect from 
Adult Rate  
(for workers aged 
Development Rate  
(for workers aged 18-
16-17 Year Olds 
Rate 
 16
22+) 21)*  
1 April 1999 £3.60 £3.00 none 
1 October 2000 £3.70 £3.20 none 
1 October 2001 £4.10 £3.50 none 
1 October 2002 £4.20 £3.60 none 
1 October 2003 £4.50 £3.80 none 
1 October 2004 £4.85 £4.10 £3.00 
1 October 2005 £5.05 £4.25 £3.00 
1 October 2006 £5.35 £4.45 £3.30 
* The development rate can apply to workers aged 22 and above during their first six months in a new job 
with a new employer if they are receiving ‘accredited training’.  
Source: http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/index.shtml.  
 
The NMW was introduced alongside other reforms. In 1999 there were reductions in 
income tax and NI contributions for low paid workers and the introduction of the 
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). Figure 5 illustrates the ways in which WFTC was 
more generous than Family Credit, which it replaced. 
 
Figure 5: Main Characteristics of Family Credit and Working Families 
Tax Credit  
Family Credit Working Families Tax Credit 
 
Administered and assessed by the Benefits 
Agency 
Administered and assessed by the Inland 
Revenue 
Claimed by woman in a couple Claimed by man or woman according to 
couple’s choice 
Paid by direct debit to bank account or a BA 
order book (cashable at a Post Office) 
Paid through wage packet by employer or 
direct from Inland Revenue 
Main earner must be working 16 hours per 
week or more 
Main earner must be working 16 hours per 
week or more 
Extra credit for those working 30 hours or 
more per week 
Extra credit for those working 30 hours or 
more per week 
Withdrawn at the rate of 70 pence for each 
extra £1 over threshold 
Withdrawn at the rate of 55 pence for each 
extra £1 over threshold 
Paid over a six month period Paid over a six month period 
Started to be withdrawn once net income 
reached £79 per week 
Started to be withdrawn once net income 
reached £90 per week 
One adult credit per household, plus age 
related credit for each child 
One adult credit per household, plus age 
related credit for each child 
Contained some help with childcare costs More generous help with childcare costs 
Capital over £8,000 disqualified from benefit; 
capital between £3,000 and £8,000, assumed 
investment income reduces benefit 
proportionately 
Capital over £8,000 disqualified from benefit; 
capital between £3,000 and £8,000, assumed 
investment income reduces benefit 
proportionately
 
One consequence of the WFTC for co-habiting couples was that the payment largely 
went to the earner rather than the primary carer. This shift from ‘purse’ to ‘wallet’ raised 
important issues about the uneven distribution and control of household income (Goode 
et al, 1998). Subsequently, the Government decided to disentangle work incentive and 
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child support elements and in 2003 introduced a separate Working Tax Credit (WTC) for 
low paid workers, paid direct to the employee, and a Child Tax Credit (CTC) paid direct 
to the main carer. WTC eligibility was extended to include single people and childless 
couples, although restricted to people aged over 25 (see Figure 6).  
 
WTC and CTC have integrated previously fragmented systems and increased levels of 
financial support but have proved administratively complex. Higher caseloads have 
drawn more people into the tax credit system of income testing (see later). In April 2006, 
approximately 1.88 million families were receiving WTC, 1.57 million of which also 
received CTC (Adam and Browne, 2006, p. 9). 
 
From the Government’s perspective tax credits and the NMW complement each other. 
The NMW underpins in-work tax credits by ensuring a minimum rate of pay but does not 
respond to household needs or the income of other workers in the household. Tax credits 
provide support tailored to an individual household’s needs, for example, reflecting the 
number of children in a family. They also help parents balance work and family life by 
providing support to those working part time. 
 
Figure 6: Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit 
Working Tax Credit: Families with children, and workers with a disability, are eligible for WTC 
provided at least one adult works 16 or more hours per week. Workers with no children and no 
disability are only eligible if they are aged 25 or over and work at least 30 hours per week. WTC 
is made up of a basic element, with an extra payment for couples and lone parents (i.e. for 
everyone except childless single people), as well as an additional payment for those working at 
least 30 hours per week (30 hours in total for couples). WTC includes supplementary payments 
for disability, severe disability and those over 50. 
 
The childcare element of WTC is available to lone parents with a child under 16 years working 
16 hours or more per week and to couples where partners work for 16 hours or more per week (or 
if one is incapacitated and thus unable to care for children). In 2006/07 the childcare component 
provided 80% of eligible childcare expenditure of up to £175 per week for families with one child 
or £300 for families with two or more children (i.e. up to £140 or £240 per week respectively).  
 
Child Tax Credit: CTC is a single integrated benefit paid on top of the non mean tested Child 
Benefit and directly to the main carer. CTC is made up of a number of elements: a family 
element, a baby element (for families with a child under the age of 1), a child element, a disabled 
child additional element and a severely disabled child supplement. Entitlement to CTC does not 
depend on employment status, but does require that the claimant be responsible for at least one 
child under the age of 16 (or aged 16–18 and in full-time education).  
 
CTC and WTC are subject to a single means test operating at the family level. 
 
Source: Phillips and Sibieta, 2006. 
 
The combination of a NMW with tax credits and other reforms has reduced the severity 
of the unemployment and poverty traps. Table 4 illustrates the impact of the 
Government’s reforms on high ‘effective marginal tax rates’ (EMTRs) between 1998 and 
2007. Table 5 illustrates real terms increase in what the Government describes as the 
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‘Minimum Income Guarantee’ between 1999 and 2007.  These theoretical incentives are 
‘personalised’ through software packages used by front line advisers that enable them to 
provide individualised ‘better off in work calculations’ for unemployed and other 
workless claimants.   
 
It is important to note that the ‘make work pay’ strategy is complemented by other 
instruments. These include a diverse range of policies from practical assistance with the 
cost of making the transition from benefit payments to wages, through to the 
development of new services that facilitate employment. Perhaps the most important is 
the ‘National Childcare Strategy’ that aims to increase the supply of affordable child 
care.4 There is also the combined effort of Government Departments to influence and, 
where necessary, regulate employer recruitment and personnel practices, including the 
implementation of anti-discrimination legislation and the right to request flexible working 
hours (Keter, 2006).  
 
Table 4: The effect of the Government’s reforms on high marginal deduction rates 
Marginal deduction rate1 Before Budget 1998 2007-08 system of tax and 
benefits 
Over 100 per cent  5,000  0 
Over 90 per cent  130,000  45,000 
Over 80 per cent  300,000  165,000 
Over 70 per cent  740,000  205,000 
Over 60 per cent  760,000  1,680,000 
1 Marginal deduction rates are for working heads of households in receipt of income-related benefits or tax 
credits where at least one person works weekly 16 hours or more, and the head of the household is not a 
disabled person. 
Note: Figures are cumulative. Before Budget 1998 based on 1997-98 estimated caseload and take-up rates; 
the 2007-08 system of tax and benefits is based on 2004-05 caseload and take-up rates. 
Source: A strong and strengthening economy: Investing in Britain’s future, Pre Budget report 2006, Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, Table 4.2, The Stationery Office, London. 
 
Table 5: Weekly Minimum Income Guarantees 1999-2007 
 April 1999 April 2007 Percentage 
increase in 
real terms2 
Family1 with one child, full-time work £182  £275  22% 
Family1 with one child, part-time work £136  £215  27% 
Single person, 25 or over, full-time work £113  £178  27% 
Couple, no children, 25 or over, full-time work £117  
 
£211  45% 
Single disabled person in full-time work £139  £222  29% 
Single disabled person in part-time work £109  £163  20% 
                                                 
4 The number of registered child care places doubled between 1997 and 2006 to 1.28 million delivered by 
95,000 registered providers. The Government’s target is that “by 2010 there is “a child care place for all 
children aged between three and 14, from 8am to 6pm each day of the week, including school holidays” 
(Hutton, 2007). There remain, however, significant problems with the affordability and accessibility of 
such child care provision (Harker, 2006) 
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Assumes single earner household, the prevailing rate of NMW and that the family receives the full 
entitlement of Family Credit/Disability Working Allowance or WTC/CTC.  
Full-time work is assumed to be 35 hours. Part-time work is assumed to be 16 hours. 
1Applies to lone parents and couples with children alike. 
2RPI growth is taken from HM Treasury’s economic forecasts. 
Source: A strong and strengthening economy: Investing in Britain’s future, Pre Budget report 2006, Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, Table 4.1, The Stationery Office, London. 
 
4.3.2 Activation Requirements: JSA and WFIs  
 
New Labour has intensified the JSA regime. All JSA claimants are subject to regular 
administrative interactions, such as fortnightly job search reviews, that aim to encourage 
continuous job search, ensure that claimants meet JSA conditionality, and discourage 
fraud. Access to more intensive support increases in line with duration of unemployment 
culminating in eligibility for a New Deal programme. The tapered access to support 
reflects a balance between targeting support on those at risk of drifting into long term 
unemployment while minimising deadweight costs. There is no profiling system but 
some groups do get early access to programmes, including ex-offenders, refugees, and 
some homeless people.  
 
The Government has also extended conditionality to partners and spouses of the JSA 
unemployed with no child care responsibilities. These ‘joint claim’ provisions apply to 
any partner born after 1957 who is now required to be available for full time work, meet 
regular job search obligations and, when eligible, enter a New Deal.  This change aims to 
end the assumption of ‘spouse dependency’ in the system.  
 
WFIs for non-JSA benefit claimants were introduced in 2001.  Attending a WFI is now a 
condition of receiving benefit. The PA has discretion to ‘defer’ the WFI and there are 
some limited exemptions for prescribed groups. At the WFI the claimant must be 
prepared to answer questions (if asked) about such matters as:  
• Educational qualifications/vocational training; 
• Employment history and employment related skills; 
• Any current paid/unpaid employment; 
• Caring responsibilities; and 
• Any medical condition which puts the person at a disadvantage in getting a job.  
Since October 2005 most claimants who attend a WFI have been required to complete an 
action plan agreed with a PA that might include referral to an employment programme.  
Legally the claimant does not as yet have to agree to take any action. It is attending and 
taking part in the interview, and agreeing an action plan, which is a requirement. 
After the first WFI different groups are subject to different patterns of mandatory 
attendance. Lone parents, for example, have to attend a further mandatory WFI after six 
months. Those on IS for a year and whose youngest child is aged below 11 have to attend 
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six-monthly; those whose youngest child is aged 11 or over have to attend quarterly 
(Harker, 2006, p. 23).  
WFI attendance had been less intense for those on disability benefits but a new pattern of 
six mandatory WFIs  for selected IB claimants was introduced with ‘Pathways to Work’ a 
new employment programme piloted in selected areas since 2003. In April 2008 IB will 
itself be replaced by a new ‘Employment Support Allowance’ (ESA). When claiming 
ESA claimants will initially be placed on a ‘holding benefit’, paid at JSA rates, and, after 
medical assessment, those with ‘more manageable conditions’ will be paid extra only if 
they participate in WFIs and work related activities.  A smaller group of those with more 
‘severe conditions’ will receive higher rates of benefit immediately and, although 
required to attend a WFI, will only participate in other work related activities on a 
voluntary basis. The Government has indicated that levels of conditionality for both ESA 
and existing IB claimants are likely to increase as evidence on impacts builds and as 
resources and delivery capacity allow. 
In less than five years WFIs have developed from an initial ‘one off’ requirement at the 
start of a benefit claim into a flexible activation instrument targeted at lone parents, 
partners and people on disability benefits.  
 
4.3.3 Claims, Appeals and Sanctions  
 
To make a claim for benefit a working age applicant must call a ‘First Contact Officer’, 
based in a call centre. This official identifies the clients’ personal circumstances, issues 
the appropriate benefit claim form and books an appointment with a PA (usually within 3 
to 4 working days). Prior to meeting the PA an individual is first seen by a Financial 
Assessor who checks their forms, ascertains their financial circumstances and answers 
questions about the benefit claim. All claimants must then attend a WFI with the PA 
whose task is to assess employability, identify barriers and provide employment 
assistance. They may match and submit the individual to vacancies available on the 
computerised ‘Labour Market System’. Claimants are then subject to job search, 
activation and WFI requirements related to the benefit they are entitled to. This JCP 
‘customer experience’ process has been designed to reinforce its employment first 
strategy by separating benefit advice from employment assistance (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Jobcentre Plus Active Benefit Regime 2007 
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Currently a person who fails to attend a WFI usually has five days in which to show 
‘good cause’ for that failure or sanctions will be applied. The type of sanction depends on 
the stage of the claim. Failure to attend a WFI when a claim is first made means no 
benefit will be paid. For those with an existing claim the sanction will usually entail a 
benefit reduction of 20%.  
 
JSA claimants are by contrast subject to a tougher sanction regime. In effect there are 
three types of sanctions: 
 
• Varied length sanctions: JSA claimants lose benefit for up to 26 weeks if they 
leave or are dismissed or refuse a job without good cause. A JCP decision maker 
determines the length of the penalty but it usually lasts the full 26 weeks.  
• Fixed-length sanctions: These are imposed if the claimant does not follow a 
Jobseekers Direction, fails to attend or leaves a mandatory programme without 
good cause. The claimant receives a two week sanction for a first offence, four 
weeks the second time they break the rules and 26 weeks for the third instance of 
non-compliance. 
New Claims Financial 
Assessor at Jobcentre 
Plus Office 
Contact Centre 
(claim details 
taken over 
phone) 
Jobseekers Allowance 
13 Week 
Restart 
Personal 
Adviser  
New Claims Personal Adviser 
 
Fortnightly Job Review 
12 Month Restart 
Personal Adviser 
6 Month Restart 
Personal Adviser 
Incapacity Benefit 
Personal Adviser 
Lone Parent 
Personal Adviser 
Referral to a 
voluntary New 
Deal 
Incapacity Benefit 
Income Support
 
Benefit Processing 
Centre (administers and 
delivers payments) 
18 Month Restart 
Personal Adviser
Aged 18-24 Mandatory  New Deal 
Programme with New Deal Adviser 
Aged 25+ Mandatory  New Deal 
Programme with New Deal 
Adviser
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• Disallowances: A ‘disallowance’ stops benefit being paid when there are 
entitlement doubts, for example, the claimant fails to attend an interview or is 
determined to be unavailable for or not actively seeking work.  
 
There is a right of appeal against a decision that the claimant did not take part in an 
interview. The unemployed may also appeal on issues related to the reasonableness of a 
JSAg, whether the applicant is available for or actively seeking work, whether they have 
lost a job through misconduct or had ‘good cause’ for not participating in or leaving a 
training programme. 
 
Decisions about entitlement are made on behalf of the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions. All sanctions and benefit disallowances are decided by a specialist ‘decision 
maker’, not by the front line official involved in the case. A ‘decision maker’ has to 
reconsider any decision that a claimant wishes to dispute. If the claimant remains 
dissatisfied they can appeal to an independent tribunal that has one, two or three 
members, depending on the case, with a minimum of one legally qualified. There is a 
strict limit for appealing, as a rule one month. 
 
Claimants must provide certain information when they appeal and the DWP must explain 
in detail the reasons for its decisions. The Appeals Service, which administers the 
process, asks if the individual wants an oral hearing. If there is no oral hearing the 
tribunal makes its decision by considering the appeal form, any evidence or other 
information provided by the claimant to support the appeal, and the decision maker’s 
submission. The decision notice includes a summary of the tribunal’s reasons for its 
decision and information on the right to request a statement of reasons for the tribunal’s 
decision. A full decision is needed if the claimant loses the appeal and wants to appeal to 
a Commissioner. If the appeal is won the DWP must carry out the tribunal’s decision. 
 
The appeal tribunal decision carries a further right of appeal, but only on a point of law, 
to the Social Security and Child Support Commissioners. This route can be exercised by 
either the applicant or DWP if they disagree with the decision. There is a further right of 
appeal from the Commissioners to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Session, and then 
to the House of Lords and European Court. Between 200,000 and 250,000 appeals are 
handled every year, and some 6,500 of these go on to the Commissioners or higher 
appeals (NAO, 2003). Separately from the decision making and appeals process, 
claimants may complain about the handling of the administrative aspects to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (the Ombudsman) through their Member 
of Parliament.  
 
Individuals with a low income might be able to get free legal advice and assistance 
including preparatory work for a hearing and subsequent appeals. 
 
Evidence of the impact of sanctions on claimant behaviour is discussed later but it is 
important to note a significant number of sanctions are subsequently overturned through 
the above revision and appeal mechanisms. Only 46% of cases referred by PAs to a 
decision maker between 2000 and 2005 resulted in a sanction, of which a certain 
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percentage are likely to have been overturned through further ‘reconsiderations’ or 
appeals (OECD, 2006, p.22). One factor is that many JSA claimants are able to show 
subsequent good cause for leaving employment or for non attendance at their 
appointments.  
 
In practice most sanctions are softened by special payments paid if a claimant is able to 
show they or their family would suffer undue hardship.  
 
4.3.44 New Deals and Pathways to Work 
 
In 1997 the Government inherited a diverse range of employment programmes many of 
which continue to operate. Access to these programmes is organised through PAs and 
they are often combined with New Deal participation. The provision includes ‘work first’ 
job search support facilities, as in ‘Programme Centres’, and a range of specialised 
schemes for disabled people (from ‘supported employment’ to assistance with aids and 
adaptations to working environments). The most significant measure is ‘Work Based 
Learning for Adults’ (WBLA) in England (Scotland and Wales have similar but separate 
programmes). ‘WBLA’ is targeted at those who have been claiming JSA for over six 
months or who are on other working age benefits. It offers basic skills, employability and 
occupational training for an average of 13 weeks. At any one point there are about 10,000 
participants and about 100,000 people go through the programme each year.  
 
New Labour’s primary programme innovation has, however, been the suite of ‘New 
Deals’ that have been at the forefront of its welfare to work strategy since 1997. Table 6 
shows that expenditure on the New Deals grew rapidly and by 2001/02 accounted for 
over half of all programme expenditure. Overall expenditure increased from £584m in 
1997/98 to £1,063 million in 2004/05 with the New Deals accounting for £526 million of 
that total. It is important to note that over half of New Deal expenditure continues to be 
allocated to the programmes for the JSA unemployed. 
 
Table 6: Employment Programme Expenditure 1997/98 to 2004/05 (£ million) 
 
Programme 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
NDYP 12 162 282 293 219 221 265 264  
ND25 plus — 17 71 42 140 166 189 169  
NDDP — 0 15 7 4 16 28 65  
NDLP — 1 12 14 9 18 20 24  
ND50 plus(1) — — 1 45 82 82 42 3  
NDfor partners — — 0 1 2 0 0 1  
All New Deal  
As % of Total 
12 
2% 
180 
30% 
381 
47% 
402 
44% 
456 
51% 
503 
55% 
544 
55% 
526 
49% 
Work Based 
Learning for 
Adults  
382 264 264 275 168 123 142 193  
Employment 
Zones 
— 1 1 72 96 94 84 75  
Pathways to 
Work 
— — — — — — 1 15  
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Other 
Programmes 
for Disabled 
People(2) 
86 92 104 107 110 119 141 143  
Other 
Programmes(3) 
104 59 56 54 68 76 98 111 
Total 584 596 806 910 898 915 992 1063 
(1) The New Deal 50 plus Employment Credit was subsumed within the 50 plus element of the Working 
Tax Credit from 2003-04. 
(2) Includes ‘Workstep’ (Supported Employment); Work Preparation (rehabilitation services);  Access to 
Work which provides help with aids and adaptations; and some smaller specialised programmes. 
(3) Includes a diverse range of provision including, for example, Programme Centres (that provide help with 
jobsearch); Action Teams and ethnic minority initiatives; specialist programmes for people with 
disabilities; and ‘Rapid Response’ services to assist after large scale redundancies. 
Notes: 1. Data comprises programme expenditure, allowance payments paid to New Deal participants and 
the New Deal 50 plus Employment Credit. 
2. All figures are rounded to the nearest £ million; expenditure of less than £500,000 is shown as a zero. 
Source: Adapted from Hansard, col. 422W, 18 April 2006. 
 
The core principle of Labour’s ‘New Deal’ for the unemployed is that individuals are 
‘guaranteed’ intensive employment assistance after a particular duration of 
unemployment and at that point all JSA claimants must be placed in a job or participate 
in a full time employment activity (where they are no longer classified as unemployed). 
The only alternative to the New Deals for the unemployed has been in Employment 
Zones (EZs), which are primarily aimed at those aged over 25 and wholly delivered by 
private sector organisations (discussed later).  
 
Between 1997 and 2001 the Government introduced a succession of other New Deal 
employment programmes aimed at lone parents, disabled people, unemployed people 
aged over 50, and partners.  Participation in these programmes is voluntary.  
 
The main characteristics of the New Deals are outlined in Figure 8. The important 
innovation associated with the New Deals was the introduction of PAs. These front line 
workers, like case managers in other systems, are expected to develop an Action Plan, 
assess employability, provide job search assistance, and tackle employment barriers 
through referrals to an array of support programmes usually delivered by contracted 
providers. PAs have the task of weaving  together available services and are expected to 
intervene more directly in the micro regulation of individual behaviour, encouraging or 
requiring claimants to search for jobs and/or engage in activities that improve 
employability. 
 
Figure 8:  New Deal Programmes and Pathways to Work 
New Deal for Young People: Those aged between 18 and 24 years must enter the NDYP after 
receiving JSA for six months. Participation begins with an advisory ‘Gateway’ period that 
includes meetings every two weeks with a PA and early attendance at a two week full time 
compulsory job search course. The priority for the PA, reinforced in performance targets, is to 
place the unemployed person into an unsubsidised job. If the person is not able to get a job then 
they must participate in a full time programme, for up to six months, which can include private 
sector subsidised employment, temporary employment in community projects or full time 
 25
education to improve basic skills. Most options involve some vocational training and there is a 
‘follow through’ process of advice and support for those unemployed at the time they complete 
their option.  
 
New Deal 25 Plus: ND25 plus is mandatory for those aged between 25 and 49 who have been 
claiming JSA for 18 of the last 21 months. It involves support from a PA and an initial Gateway 
period that can last for 16 weeks, and includes a period of compulsory full time job search 
activity.  This is followed  by an ‘Intensive Activity Period’ (IAP) lasting for, initially 13 weeks 
but which can be extended up to 26 weeks, including flexible packages of support which can 
combine work experience/placements, work focused training and help with motivation and soft 
skills. There is a period of ‘follow-through’ support if the participant returns to unemployment. 
JSA claimants aged over 50 must attend the initial interviews but are not yet subject to the 
mandatory IAP. 
 
New Deal for Lone Parents:  NDLP is a voluntary programme. A participant is allocated a 
specialist PA who constructs an agreed package of support which can include training and 
financial help with formally registered childcare. The Government is piloting an enhanced 
package of support, known as ‘NDLP Plus’, in seven areas. This package combines an advance 
payment for job search (Work Search Premium), some direct assistance with childcare, a 
guaranteed clear gain from work (via a time limited cash ‘In-Work Credit’ and tax credits) and 
support in work (from an In-Work Emergencies Fund and In-Work Support). After evaluation 
this approach may be extended to other areas. 
 
New Deal for Disabled People and Pathways to Work:  NDDP has been delivered through a 
national network of contracted Job Brokers who had flexibility in how they provided assistance 
and were paid in part on the basis of how many participants they placed in sustained employment 
(of at least 13 weeks).  NDDP is being replaced by ‘Pathways to Work’. ‘Pathways’ provision has 
gradually been extended since 2003. It combines activation through WFIs and the requirement to 
complete an action plan with a specialist PA who can make referrals to a range of options. This 
‘Choices’ package includes a ‘condition management programme’ (CMPs), developed with the 
National Health Service, a ‘Return to Work Credit’ (a time limited wage supplement), as well as 
referrals to existing provision. CMPs are not curative but can involve rehabilitation support to 
enable an individual to return to work and manage health conditions, such as, back pain, angina, 
or mental illness.  In 2007/08 the programme is being extended nationally alongside the 
introduction of the new ESA.  
 
In mid-2006 there were some 430,000 people participating in the various New Deals and 
EZs, reflecting the latest data then available. Table 7 shows also the number of ‘starts’ 
there have been on each programme since commencement and crudely the number of 
participants who have gained employment after leaving (these employment outcomes are 
discussed in more detail later).  
 
The number of people who participate in the various New Deals and other employment at 
any one point in time varies significantly as does the intensity of the level of support they 
receive. While entry to the New Deals for the unemployed is guaranteed coverage of the 
two significant ‘inactive’ groups – lone parents and those on disability benefits – is far 
less extensive and engagement so far has been with those most inclined to participate.  
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Participants on employment programmes continue to be paid their existing benefits. A 
minority are paid allowances or receive wages and are therefore removed from the JSA 
unemployment count and if they return to JSA are classified as short term unemployed. 
This has an impact on the official count of the JSA unemployed but is much less 
significant than the ‘hidden unemployment’ of large scale employment programmes in 
other European countries. 
 
Table7: New Deals and Employment Zones: All Starts and Job Entries from 
Commencement of Programme*and Participants at May-August 2006+ (000s) 
 ND for 
Young 
People 
ND 
25plus 
ND for 
Lone 
Parents 
ND for 
Disabled 
People 
ND 
50plus 
ND for 
Partners 
Employment 
Zones 
People 
Starting 
1,118.2 649.4 710.4 216.6 74.8 13.6 148.4 
People 
Getting a 
Job 
693.8 272.0 471.8 116.1 164.9 5.8 71.2 
Actual 
Participants 
95.1 48.9 57.9 140.5 54.2 3.1 26.5 
* Most New Deals commenced recruitment in 1998; those for disabled people and partners in 1999; and for 
over 50s in 2000. Full Employment Zones commenced recruitment in 2000. 
+ Most recent monthly data on leavers and participants varied across programmes. 
Source: Quarterly Statistics, November 2006, Department for Work and Pensions, London 
 
5 The Governance of Activation 
 
The governance of welfare reform has changed. Departments have been restructured, JCP 
has been created, and the Treasury has acquired greater power to steer policy through 
‘Public Service Agreements’ (‘quasi-contracts’ that set out Departmental policy 
objectives against which performance is assessed)5. In delivery there has been a 
continuing transition from a traditional highly centralised bureaucracy providing standard 
services to a more complex public-private network ‘steered’ by policy makers through 
performance targets and contracts. 
 
DWP is the key organisation responsible for the benefit system and activation policies 
and is one of the few departments that still presides over England, Scotland and Wales. 
Ministers are supported by senior civil servants in the Working Age Directorate which is 
responsible for activation policy advice, evaluation and ‘steering’. Programmes, services 
and benefits for working age people are delivered through JCP.  
 
There is no formal role for the ‘social partners’ but there is a National Employment Panel 
(NEP), comprising 25 Chief Executives, 60% of whom are from large employers in the 
private sector. The TUC nominates three representatives. Places on the NEP are 
                                                 
5 PSAs substantially change the degree to which the Treasury is able to set not only the constraints for 
departments’ policy making, as in the past, but also what policies are to be made. The policy objectives 
themselves, how policies are delivered, and how that delivery is to be measured are all now subject to 
Treasury approval and monitoring (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003). 
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‘personal’ appointments. The NEP, according to its Chief Executive, is ‘an external 
group within the heart of Government’. It is independent, albeit based in DWP, with a 
remit to “challenge, scrutinise and help develop welfare to work policies”.  
 
5.1 Jobcentre Plus 
 
JCP became operational in April 2002 and provides services and benefits for working age 
claimants. JCP has significant operational autonomy but is accountable to DWP 
Ministers. The Chief Executive of JCP is appointed on a three-year contract renewable by 
mutual consent. There is an executive Board with seven full time Directors and three 
non-executive Directors. JCP is divided into nine English Regions plus offices for Wales 
and Scotland, which in turn are subdivided into 50 Districts.   
 
JCP is ‘steered’ through a variety of ‘Performance and Resource Agreement’ targets 
agreed annually with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. These include job 
entry targets alongside targets that specify anticipated performance in paying benefits 
promptly and accurately, reducing fraud and error, helping employers fill vacancies and 
improving business efficiency and customer satisfaction. JCP is expected both to 
administer benefits efficiently and ‘activate’ claimants through an ‘employment first’ 
approach. Job outcomes are a primary measure of success.  These job entry targets are 
weighted to clearly signal the priority attached to different groups with, for example, 
greater value given for getting a lone parent into a job and least value for helping 
someone already employed to move into a new job.  
 
JCP is at the forefront of the modernisation of the British public sector. In 2002 JCP 
inherited a network of 1,500 offices and 90,000 ES and BA staff, who were primarily 
civil servants but with separate collective bargaining structures, agreements and appraisal 
systems. Staff numbers are planned to fall to just under 69,000 by 2008, a reduction of 
over 20%, at which point JCP will comprise 850 front line offices and 25 ‘contact call 
centres’.  Staff reductions are intended to impact on administrative and ‘back office’ staff 
with efficiencies being secured through the extensive use of computerised systems, call 
centres, telephones and on line technologies. The overall ‘roll out’ investment 
programme in new offices and technologies has cost over £2 billion.  
 
A National Audit Office report estimated that in 2005/06 JCP administered around £22 
billion in benefits to some 4.6 million people claiming a core working age benefit. About 
16,000 new claims for benefit were made every day and some 4,000 people helped into 
employment (NAO, 2006, p. 7). The 9,300 PAs employed by JCP conducted 10.8 million 
WFIs, about 200,000 a week (ibid, p.6). PAs conducted about 28 interviews per week and 
had an average active caseload of 30-40 customers (ibid, p. 16). 
 
5.2 Partnerships, Contracts and Contestability  
 
JCP works with a complex array of ‘partnerships’, both nationally and locally. These can 
be strategic or operational. The operational partnerships include contractual relationships 
with an extensive mixed economy of ‘for profit’ and ‘not for profit’ providers who 
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deliver most employment programmes. In 2005/06 around one third of ‘welfare to work’ 
provision was delivered through more than one thousand contracts with such providers 
(HMT, 2006, p. 119). In 2005/06 external providers delivered a total of 135,107 job 
entries, an increase of 25% from the previous year (JCP, 2006, p. 33).  
 
Typically New Deal contracts last for three years and specify in some detail the nature of 
the provision to be made available. In 2006 significant changes were made with the 
introduction of ‘prime contractors’ and experimental price competition in New Deal 
programmes for the JSA unemployed. The prime contractor model increased the size of 
contracts and reduced the number of contractors. Prime contractors undertake three 
functions. They: 
 
(a) provide directly a substantial proportion of the specified provision; 
(b) subcontract a proportion of provision to other organisations; and 
(c) manage and monitor the performance and quality of sub contractors as well as all 
their own performance. 
 
A significant flexibility is that prime contractors are not required to follow public sector 
competitive tendering rules for work they subcontract.  
 
In addition the DWP has implemented more formal experiments with private sector led 
providers where JCP has had to compete directly with external organisations. This has 
enabled DWP to ‘benchmark’ public sector performance and identify efficiencies or 
innovations that could be extended through public sector provision. The most radical of 
these experiments has been in EZs.  
 
There are two types of EZ providers. Seven areas have ‘single provider’ zones where the 
contractor has a monopoly of provision. Six areas have ‘multiple provider’ zones in 
larger urban areas where several contractors deliver services. In these ‘multiple’ zones 
providers are awarded a fixed market share and participants are randomly assigned to 
them. 
 
Both New Deals and EZs use front line advisers but zones have greater freedom to design 
their interventions due to the flexibilities given in their contracts.  Zone contractors have 
incentives  to place clients into sustained employment speedily but face a risk that if 
targets are not met the contractor will lose money. In total EZs service about 30,000 
clients a year at an estimated cost for 2005/06 of £101m. 
 
There has been much debate about the merits of private contractors and their performance 
against the regular New Deals, and some evidence is considered later. Nevertheless the 
Government has made that it plans a major expansion in the role of the private and 
voluntary sectors. 
 
6. Outcomes of Activation Policies 
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The following sections consider trends in economic activity and unemployment and the 
changing characteristics of the JSA unemployed. They consider also the role of 
evaluation and evidence about the impacts of the different components of the activation 
regime. 
 
6.1 ‘What Works’: the Role of Evaluation 
 
In the 1980s Conservative Governments placed increased emphasis on evaluation and it 
was in part the findings from studies in the 1990s that underpinned the primacy given to 
‘work first’ job search programmes (for a review see Finn et al, 1998).  
 
The commitment to evaluation was developed further in New Labour’s approach to 
‘evidence based policy’. The New Deals, WFIs and other components of the welfare to 
work strategy have been subject to systematic evaluation, the results of which have 
informed policy making and implementation. Most of these evaluation reports and impact 
studies have been undertaken under contract by independent research institutions and, 
with regular monitoring data, are published on the DWP website (at 
www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rrs-index.asp).  
 
It is important to note some limitations in this official evidence base. The research is 
generally undertaken in the early phases of programme and policy development. This 
means that initial impacts are rarely tested over a longer time frame when wider 
conditions may have changed or after any ‘innovation effect’ may have dissipated. It is 
also the case that the programmes evaluated have been in a process of continuous change 
with many significant design reforms made in response to the evidence emerging from 
the evaluations. 
 
British studies also have concentrated almost exclusively on the comparative 
effectiveness of policies in getting people off benefits and into employment.  Far less is 
known about the wider impacts on other groups in the labour market or on local 
economies. Finally, nearly all British ‘impact’ studies use analytical matching techniques 
that compare administrative data drawn from matched areas, when a programme is 
piloted, or from historical records when implementation is national6. Despite increased 
methodological expertise such findings are often contested and “few results can be 
regarded as definitive” (Bryson, 2003, p. 89).    
 
6.2 Employment, Unemployment and Inactivity 
 
At the end of 2006 there were just over 37.2 million people in the UK aged between 16 
and state pension age (60 for women and 65 years for men). Table 8 illustrates the growth 
in economic activity with the number in ILO defined employment growing by over 1.8 
                                                 
6 Despite Ministerial and Treasury interest in experimental random assignment studies they have been little 
used in evaluating British welfare to work programmes. One exception is the evaluation of the 
‘Employment Retention and Advancement’ pilot programmes that are testing approaches to delivering in-
work support (Hoggart et al, 2006). 
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million and the employment rate increasing to 74.4% between 1998 and 2006. Over the 
period the number out of work fell but ILO unemployment has recently increased.  The 
population of the economically inactive - many of whom want to work but who do not 
meet the ILO definition of unemployment - increased numerically but the overall growth 
in employment meant that the inactivity rate has continued to fall. It is important to stress 
that there are major variations in these trends with particular concentrations of working 
age benefit claimants in many cities and some localities. These variations pose particular 
challenges for implementing welfare to work programmes.  
 
Table 8: Economic Activity of Working Age People 16-59/64 (000s): 1998 and 2006  
Year (Apr-
June) 
All Total 
Economically 
Active (rate %) 
Total in 
Employment 
(rate %) 
Unemployed 
(rate %) 
Economically 
Inactive (rate 
%) 
1998 35,407 27,603 (78.0) 25,865 (73.0) 1,739 (6.3) 7.804 (22.0) 
2006 37,252 29,319 (78.7) 27,699 (74.4) 1,620 (5.5) 7.934 (21.3)  
Source: Table A.1, Labour Market Trends, Office for National Statistics, November 2006 
 
An important difference with the early 1980s is that ILO unemployment now is 
consistently higher than JSA unemployment. This change reflects in part restrictions in 
benefit eligibility rules. The trend first emerged in the late 1980s but appears, from Table 
9, to have increased again after the introduction of JSA in 1996. The gap with the JSA 
unemployment rate was just 0.8% in 1993 but increased to over 2% by 1999 and stood at 
2.4% in 2006.   
 
Table 9: JSA and ILO Unemployment and Rate, Seasonally Adjusted 1993-2006 
 JSA Claimant 
Unemployed 
JSA 
Unemployment 
Rate 
ILO 
Unemployed 
ILO 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1993 2876.6 9.7 2953 10.5
1996 2087.5 6.9 2344 8.3
1999 1248.1 4.1 1759 6.1
2002 946.6 3.1 1533 5.2
2005 861.8 2.7 1426 4.7
2006 944.1 3.0 1657 5.4
Source: Time Series Data, Office of National Statistics, at 
www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=1944 
 
6.3 JSA Durations, Leavers and ‘Repeaters’ 
 
There is considerable turnover in the JSA population with around 2.5 million claims 
made for JSA in the latest available year (HMT 2006, p.118). Between 1997/98 and 
2004/05 the administrative data on terminations shows that the number of JSA claims 
that ended with someone ‘recorded’ as entering work fell from over 1.1 million in 
1997/98, or 35% of ‘known destinations’, to 751,900 in 2004/05, or 27% of ‘known 
destinations’ (Hansard, 31 January 2006, col. 440W). The number recorded as returning 
to work significantly underestimates the movement into employment but it appears that 
as the number of people claiming JSA declined so too did the proportion who were 
leaving for a job.  
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A more detailed survey of a sample of benefit leavers in 2004 showed that the proportion 
of JSA clients returning to work of over 16 hours a week was 50% and this was similar 
for most categories of benefit leavers apart for the sick and disabled claiming IS only. 
Table 10 contains more detail on the reasons why people ceased claiming benefit. 
Transitions onto other benefits accounted for a large proportion of sick and disabled 
terminations but only for 9% and 8% of lone parents and the JSA unemployed 
respectively. Another important factor for ceasing JSA claims was the 10% whose benefit 
was stopped or who were told they were no longer eligible, in many cases because of 
sanctions  
 
Table 10: Why Stopped Receiving Benefit, by Benefit/Client Group 2004 (%) 
 Sick and  
disabled  
IS and IB 
(per cent) 
Sick and 
disabled 
IS only 
(per cent) 
Sick and 
disabled 
IB only 
(per cent) 
Lone  
Parents 
(per 
cent) 
JSA 
(per 
cent) 
Returned to/started working 16 hours 
or more 
50  
 
26  52  55  50 
Returned to/started fulltime 
training/education 16 hours or more 
2  
 
2  2  2  6 
Moved onto another benefit for 
people who are out of work 
19  
 
33  18  9  8 
Returned to/started working less than 
16 hours 
3  
 
2  3  1  2 
Partner status changed/partner started 
claiming on their behalf 
2  
 
5  1  7  2 
Began living with partner 1  
 
3  1  16  1 
Failed medical assessment 7  
 
3  7  *  * 
Told no longer eligible/benefit 
stopped 
7  
 
11  6  3  10 
Retired 1  4  1  *  1 
Went abroad/to prison /moved house 1  
 
1  1  1  4 
Temporary break from 
claim/problem with claim 
2  
 
2  2  1  6 
Other 3  2  3  1  9 
Not stated 2  3  2  3  1 
Don’t know 1  1 1 1 1 
Total of Sample 6,636   341 6,295 7,245 1,301 
Source:  Coleman N. and Kennedy L. (2005) Destination of benefit leavers 2004, Department for Work 
and Pensions, Research Report No 244, Norwich, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Table 3.1. 
 
JSA benefit durations have fallen since 1998 (see Table 11). The total number of young 
people aged 18-24 claiming JSA for 6 months or more fell from nearly 109,000 in 1998 
to 40,000 in 2004, and those who had claimed for over a year fell from 13,400 to 2,400. 
There has since been an increase and by 2006 58,400 had claimed for over six months of 
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whom 10,800 had claimed for over a year in 2006.7 What is noticeable is that the number 
of young people claiming JSA for less than 6 months in 2006 was 227,200, only 5,000 
fewer than in 1998, despite an overall fall in the claimant count over the same period of 
around 16%.  
 
Table 11:  JSA Claimant Unemployed Age and Duration (UK, seasonally adjusted) 
 All JSA Claimants 18-24 Year Old JSA Claimants 
 All Up to 
6 
months  
Over 6 
and up 
to 12 
months  
Over 
12 
months 
% over 
12 
months
All Up to 
6 
months 
Over 6 
and up 
to 12 
months  
Over 
12 
months  
% over 
12 
months
1998 1338.4 730.5 242.3 365.7 27.3 339.1 232.3 61.5 45.4 13.3 
2000 1080.9 654.0 183.6 243.4 22.5 261.5 215.3 40.0 6.3 2.4 
2002 935.1 621.0 159.7 154.4 16.5 243.1 203.8 34.1 5.1 2.1 
2004 845.6 562.0 148.6 135.0 16.0 235.8 195.8 33.8 6.2 2.6 
2006 939.3 609.8 179.9 149.6 15.9 285.6 227.2 47.6 10.8 3.8 
Source: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSDSeries1.asp, updated on 7/ 2/2007 
 
Some of the short term JSA claimants are NDYP leavers who do not find or keep work. 
Around 40% of NDYP participants who find work claim JSA again within a year. In May 
2006 it was reported that 23% of NDYP participants were on the programme for a second 
time, 9% for a third time (Hansard, 24 January 2007, col. 1871W). This pattern of 
recycling between benefits and programmes has been found in the other New Deals. For 
example, one evaluation reports that 29% of those who gained a job through NDLP 
returned to IS within a year (Evans, 2003).  
 
New Deal ‘recycling’ takes place in the context of a wider issue about ‘repeat claims’ for 
benefits. For JSA it seems that there is an increased concentration of unemployment 
amongst individuals who repeatedly claim benefit without finding sustained employment. 
In 2006 two thirds of all JSA claims, some 1.6 million were made by people who had 
claimed at least once before. It was estimated that a quarter of a million new JSA 
claimants had spent at least three-quarters of the previous two years claiming benefits. 
About 12% had spent six of the past seven years on benefits (Hutton, 2006, p. 17). 
 
A detailed survey of ‘repeaters’ who had made at least three claims for JSA gave an 
insight into why such recycling occurs (Carpenter, 2006). The majority (72%) of 
respondents indicated that they had not been able to find ‘suitable’ work. The main 
problem was the type of work available rather than being able to find work at all. Many 
had been able to find work of some kind, as shown by the 67% who moved into work 
when their last JSA spell ended, and the 41% who were in work at the time of the survey. 
Most had no option but to leave their last job (for example because a temporary job 
ended, or because they were made redundant or sacked). Only 6% of respondents left 
                                                 
7 The fact that more young people were in receipt of JSA beyond a year have been caused by delivery 
problems because just as the client group increased provider capacity was disrupted during a protracted re-
contracting process. There are also a limited number of exemptions allowed if local managers consider the 
claimant might be violent or disruptive if mandated to attend.  
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their last job through choice. The evidence “consistently indicated an inability to find 
sustained employment rather than a choice to avoid it” (ibid, p.3). 
 
Many respondents reported personal barriers that made it more difficult to find and retain 
sustainable employment. One in five reported a serious health problem or disability and 
this increased to a quarter of those aged 50 or over. Overall, 23% had no qualifications 
and 17% had problems with literacy or numeracy. In addition, 8% reported problems 
with criminal records, 3% with drugs and alcohol and 14% said there had been a time in 
the last year when they had no permanent place to live.  
 
The analysis suggests that the JSA regime is successful in moving people into work but 
for a significant group of repeaters it is less successful because it is failing to tackle 
“longer-term issues such as skills, employability and financial independence” (ibid, p. 3).  
 
Another problem identified in a major Government review is that the ‘work first’ 
approach means that a significant cohort of JSA claimants have few transferable skills or 
qualifications and “become trapped in low paid, entry-level work”. The review pointed 
out that “as the economy restructures in response to global economic changes, problems 
with employment retention (will) worsen, particularly for the low skilled” (HMT 2006, 
p.118). The issue of job retention and progression in work has now been identified as one 
of the key challenges facing the British activation system. 
 
6.4 The Impact of Activation Requirements: Restart, JSA and WFIs 
 
In 1986 the introduction of mandatory Restart interviews after each six months 
unemployment appears to have reduced the number of claimants by 8.5% and the 
introduction of JSA was estimated to have reduced the claimant count by between 
100,000 and 200,000. The JSA reduction was due in part to tighter eligibility rules but the 
new regime had also, according to one Government evaluation, flushed out “significant 
numbers of employed and inactive claimants” (Sweeney and McMahon, 1998, p.201).  
 
An official evaluation, using statistically matched control groups, reported that Restart 
both increased the rate at which unemployed claimants left benefit and lowered the time 
they spent unemployed on leaving benefit (White and Lakey, 1992). There appeared to be 
two effects, often distinguished as ‘deterrent’ and ‘treatment’ effects. Restart ‘shook the 
tree’ (the deterrent effect); with claimants more likely to leave benefit before they 
attended the interview. Restart also increased the rate at which claimants received job 
offers “either through initiation of contact with employers or through improvements in 
the search behaviour of the unemployed” (Dolton and O’Neill, 1995). A subsequent 
analysis of the destinations of these Restart participants after five years reported that the 
“threat component associated with being called for an interview may account for the 
short-run effects of the programme, but the services provided at the interview itself, such 
as job search assistance, may be important determinants of the long-run effects” (Dolton 
and O’Neill, 2002, p. 382-383). 
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A subsequent ‘before and after’ official evaluation of JSA reported that its introduction 
raised exit rates from the claimant count after 1996 by between 21% and 28% and over a 
longer time frame the new regime appeared to stimulate more active job search (Rayner 
et al, 2000).  
 
An independent study, based on an analysis of LFS data, criticised the methodology 
employed in the official evaluation. Manning (2005) found that the introduction of JSA 
had a large impact on off-flow rates, reducing the claimant count by about 8%, but he 
questions whether it encouraged greater search activity. He suggests that in comparing 
the search activity of ostensibly matched groups both before and after the introduction of 
JSA the earlier evaluation failed to compare like with like. JSA had been effective in 
‘weeding out’ the inactive unemployed but it was mistaken to assume that because those 
sampled after its introduction were more actively seeking work that this was anything 
more than a compositional effect. JSA claimants may have been more ‘active’ but many 
who had exited from benefit had not entered employment but had entered into inactivity 
or other unknown destinations (2005, p.4). 
 
This critique was given support in an econometric analysis of JSA benefit exits in 
Northern Ireland. McVicar (2006) took advantage of a ‘natural experiment’ that occurred 
when a ‘Jobs and Benefit’ regime was introduced for JSA participants over a seven year 
period. He found that tougher monitoring significantly increased the outflow rate from 
claimant unemployment and reduced claim duration, albeit the “hazard rate for exits to 
employment display(ed) the smallest proportional increase of 19%” (ibid, p. 14). 
McVicar concludes that monitoring intensity “can affect the behaviour of unemployment 
benefit recipients independently of other reform measures” but that, as predicted by 
Manning’s model, a significant group of those exiting will enter situations where there 
job search will be reduced.  
 
The distinction between exits from benefit and those into employment has been made 
also in evaluations of WFIs. The initial experimental introduction of the interviews had 
little impact on exits but when targeted at lone parents and delivered more effectively 
they increased the rate at which claimants joined programmes and left benefits. The 
introduction of WFIs for lone parents, for example, increased participation in NDLP by 
approximately 15% and increased the proportion of people leaving IS by between one 
and two percentage points after a year (Knight and Thomas, 2006). The impact of WFIs 
has more recently been assessed alongside the employment programmes with which they 
are associated. A longitudinal matched comparison evaluation found that the combined 
effect of both on lone parents started after a year and that after 18 months the benefit exit 
rate had increased by 4%, indicating that 11% more had exited than would have done so 
without the intervention (Knight et al, 2006, p.2). Initial evidence from the Pathway pilot 
areas reported that when compared with national rates around 8% more IB claimants left 
benefits and 9% more entered employment in the first six months of their claim (DWP, 
2006, p.27). 
 
6.5 The Impact of ‘Make Work Pay’ 
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The Low Pay Commission has sponsored a growing body of evidence on the NMW and 
much of this has found negligible impacts on employment levels, albeit there are 
problems for some small employers; the impacts on wage inflation have been 
‘contained’; and it appears to have had little independent impact on productivity (for 
detailed evidence see www.lowpay.gov.uk).  The Commission estimates that over a 
million low paid workers have benefited from each increase in the NMW and that the 
prime beneficiaries have been women, part time workers, young people and some 
minority ethnic groups, typically employed in low paid sectors (such as hotels and 
restaurants) and in parts of the country where low pay has been prevalent.  
 
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the NMW, tax credits and the New Deals. One 
study of the impact of such policy changes on the lone parent employment rate, which 
had increased from 42% in 1992 to 56% in 2005, concluded that five points of that 14 
point rise could be attributed to the policy reforms implemented between 1999 and 2002 
(Gregg et al, 2006). An independent review, commissioned by DWP, suggests that by 
2004/05 the combination of increased financial support for children, the extension of 
child care facilities, ‘making work pay’, and the increase in lone parent and general 
employment rates had helped lift 700,000 children out of poverty (Harker, 2006, p. 11).  
 
A group based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) has undertaken several independent 
assessments of the impact of tax and benefit policies on financial incentives. The IFS 
group point to the complex impact policy change has on different family and individual 
circumstances (Adam et al, 2006). Incentives to work for lone parents have increased and 
changes to the withdrawal rate of tax credits and benefits mean that some very low-
waged parents have seen the effective withdrawal of their in-work financial support fall 
from 70% to 37% (Brewer and Shephard, 2004, p. 11). This has led to a fall in the 
number of families facing very high effective marginal tax rates. A key problem, 
however, is that because tax credits have now been extended to people on higher wages 
they have also increased the number of families facing some sort of benefit or tax credit 
withdrawal as their income rises, “worsening their incentives to progress” (ibid, p. 11). 
As a result the number of those in work “facing an effective marginal tax rate of over 50%” 
has increased by almost 900,000 (ibid, p. viii).  Another problem has been the significant 
disincentive to work now faced by the non-working partners of those in households where 
someone is already claiming a tax credit  
 
Over a longer time frame the IFS group found that between 1979 and 2000 both incentives 
to work and incentives to progress once in work had strengthened but had “weakened on 
average since 2000” (Adam et al, 2006, p.2). Only part of these changes were the direct 
result of tax and benefit reforms. They reported that “changes in average wages, wage 
inequality, rent levels and working patterns within two-adult families” were also important 
explanatory factors (ibid). Paradoxically one reason for the decline in financial work 
incentives was the Government’s commitment to reduce child poverty that has led it to 
increase levels of child benefits for those out of as well as those in work. This has ‘blunted 
work incentives’ and illustrates the complex trade-offs that confront policy makers.  
 
6.6 The Impact of the New Deals and Employment Zones  
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The benefit off-flow rates and employment impacts of each of the New Deals has been 
evaluated. As noted previously most evaluations are undertaken in the early phases of 
programme implementation and each New Deal has been in a process of continuous 
change often involving significant design reforms.8 This section concentrates on the 
evaluations of the New Deals for the unemployed and the EZ private sector model against 
which the ND 25 plus has been assessed (evaluations of the other programmes can be 
found at www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rrs-index.asp).  
 
Several major studies of NDYP were undertaken between 1998 and 2002. All reported 
positive impacts of moderate size from the overall programme - between 5 and 9 
percentage points reduction in welfare claiming (see Riley and Young, 2001; Blundell, 
2001; White and Riley, 2002). A macroeconomic evaluation found that long-term youth 
unemployment would have been almost twice as high without NDYP and it increased 
GDP by £500 million a year (Riley and Young, 2001).  
 
One component of the NDYP effect has been from ‘shaking the tree’, as found in earlier 
evaluations of Restart and JSA. A significant minority of claimants withdraw their 
benefit claims on being invited to mandatory NDYP interviews and another group cease 
claiming rather than participate in the mandatory options phase.  
 
Most positive NDYP impacts have been attributed in particular to the contribution made 
by advisers especially in those Jobcentres where PAs  place a strong emphasis on ‘work 
first’ practices (NAO, 2006, p.13; Hasluck and Green, 2007). An analysis of performance 
variations in the NDYP found greatest impact in those offices where PAs delivered 
closely-spaced repeat interviewing of jobseekers, a large number of interviews (reflecting 
persistent follow-up), use of sanctions to enforce the mandatory nature of the programme, 
high expenditure on external services for clients (interpreted as a means of freeing PAs to 
focus on more job-ready clients), and sparing usage of short courses that helped clients 
choose work experience or educational options (White, 2004). 
 
The impact of the ‘options’ phase has been less marked, partly because this group have 
more significant employment barriers. The wage subsidy element has produced 
quantifiable effects but the other options worked less well (Bonjour et al, 2001).  There 
have since been changes in programme design, contracting and the approach of 
individual providers, many of whom point to impressive local results with a difficult to 
place client group. There has, however, been little evaluation of these claims.  
 
There was much early concern about the destination of a third of the young people 
leaving NDYP who were recorded as entering ‘unknown destinations’. A national follow 
up survey found that of the sample contacted 56% had initially left the New Deal to enter 
employment and just over 5% reported that they left because of a sanction (O’Donnell, 
                                                 
8 One exception was an impact analysis of the NDLP which tracked the situation of matched participants 
for 48 months. It reported that NDLP participation raised the proportion off benefit, compared with the 
control group by 20%, and the employment rate was 11% higher. The evaluation warned, however, that 
poor quality of the matching data might have impacted the results (Knight et al, 2006, p. 3).  
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2001). Some had continued to ‘sign on’, others had been ill, and some had entered 
education or otherwise left the labour market. The response rate was just below 50% but 
the researchers suggested there was no discernible evidence that the most disadvantaged 
were disproportionately represented among those who could not be contacted. 
 
An evaluation of the ND25 plus reported that when it was redesigned to more closely 
mirror the NDYP there was an improvement in participants’ job entry and off benefit 
rates (Hasluck, 2002). More recent evaluations have matched EZ and ND25 plus 
participants in comparable unemployment areas. One study found that 20 months after 
becoming eligible for either programme 55% of EZ and 51% of New Deal participants 
were either in jobs or had been in them (Hales et al, 2003).  The evaluations reported that 
EZs appear to secure somewhat better net impact results than the New Deal, albeit they 
are more expensive.  
 
One significant finding from participant surveys was that in both EZ and New Deal areas 
many of the jobs that had been sustained for over 13 weeks “had not lasted in the longer 
term” (ibid, p. 1). Many jobs were temporary and were with small employers and offered 
low wages. The personal barriers of the clients, such as ill health, lack of skills and 
qualifications also contributed to the short duration of job tenure. The participant surveys 
found that those who were least likely to have entered employment, or to have retained it, 
were the ‘harder to help’ – those who had a history of unstable employment or 
characteristics such as a criminal record. Even “some 20 months after being eligible to 
participate, almost half the participants had spent no time in paid work”. 
 
These findings have reinforced more critical assessments of the employment impact of 
the New Deals. Some suggest that the reduction in claimant unemployment simply 
reflected a stronger labour market and they point out that wider youth unemployment, as 
measured by the LFS, is far higher than the JSA claimant count would suggest (Field and 
White, 2007). Others point out that many New Deal participants do not get jobs and a 
significant minority of those who get jobs do not retain them. The problems of placement 
and retention are most acute for people from minority ethnic groups, for those with the 
greatest individual barriers, and for those living in areas of highest unemployment. One 
analysis found that job entry rates in the older industrial cities and in inner city London 
were as low as 30%. This poor performance was attributed to the interplay between local 
labour market conditions, the characteristics of participants and the capacity of local 
delivery systems (Sunley and Martin, 2005).  
 
Over the life of the New Deals unemployment has fallen and those entering the 
programme have had more employment barriers than the first cohort of entrants. At the 
same time the rapid growth of the labour market in the late 1990s has been followed by a 
less buoyant period with JSA unemployment increasing between 2005 and 2006. One 
consequence is that overall NDYP job entry rates have fallen, from 51% in 1998 to 34% 
in 2005 (Field and White, 2007). Job entry rates for the ND25 plus improved after 
programme redesign in 2001, to reach over 35% in 2004, but the job entry rate has since 
fallen below 30% (CESI, 2007, Chart 1).  
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These job entry trends have reinforced the pressure for a ‘fresh start’ for the New Deals 
for the JSA unemployed and there is likely to be a major programme redesign in the next 
wave of welfare to work reform (Freud, 2007).  
 
6.7 Sanctions Research 
 
Ministers suggest that sanctions do “drive behaviour” (Hansard, col. 256W, 16 April 
2007). Of those claiming JSA the majority comply with requirements. Only 14% are are 
referred for a decision and only 4% actually have a sanction applied (ibid). About 80% of 
lone parents attend their WFI and two thirds of those who do not attend subsequently 
attend, with 40,300, or 4.4% experiencing a sanction between April 2005 and March 
2006 (Hansard, col. 784W, 19 April 2007). About 1% of IB claimants have been 
sanctioned for not attending a WFI in Pathways pilot areas. Most disputes about disability 
or lone parent benefits continue to concern entitlement issues, such as the interpretation 
of medical evidence or the living arrangements between ‘partners’.  
 
Figure 9 outlines trends in the imposition of different types of JSA sanctions between 
2000 and 2006. What appears significant has been a marked fall in the number of varied 
length sanctions, which measure compliance with the JSA regime, in contrast with an 
increase in the number of disallowances  (Bivand, 2006, p.20).  
 
 
Figure 9: Adverse decisions for JSA Labour Market questions for sanctions and 
disallowances: June 2000 to August 2006 
 
Source: ONS (2006) DWP Quarterly Statistical Summary: First Release, Information Directorate, 
Department for Work and Pensions, Newcastle, p. 14 (at 
http://193.129.121.133/mediacentre/pressreleases/2006/nov/ifd091106SSnov06.pdf).  
 
A 2005 study found that while adults are referred for sanctions more frequently young 
people aged 18 to 24 experience proportionately more JSA and New Deal sanctions. 
Young people accounted for 72% of the ‘fixed length’ sanctions that relate largely to the 
requirements of Jobseekers Directions and the mandatory New Deals (Conway and 
Groves, 2006). A systematic review found evidence that the sanctions regime is complex 
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and difficult to understand, both for claimants and PAs, and that a significant minority of 
claimants claimed not to have been told about the possibility of sanctions (SSAC, 2006, 
p. 61). Studies suggested that those who are sanctioned “appear to be more disadvantaged 
than their peers” (ibid, p. 65). In general the evidence suggested that the possibility of 
sanctions has only a weak influence on JSA claimant behaviour, especially in terms of 
job search, but that the influence might be more significant for those who had 
experienced a sanction. 
 
Evidence on the NDYP regime suggests that sanctions did bring about a greater level of 
compliance and an increase in job seeking activity. In one study interviewees in the 
‘follow through’ phase reported that the threat of benefit sanctions was a motivating 
factor to comply with the requirements of the programme (O'Connor et al, 2001). The 
threat of reduced income, however temporary, acted as a disincentive for many to refuse 
an option or leave early. Nearly all those interviewed agreed with sanctions in principle 
but felt there were inconsistencies in their treatment and that the reasons for their 
behaviour were not always taken into account. Such views have been echoed in other 
case studies (Finn, 2003).  
 
The other main impact of sanctions is financial with one quantitative study reporting that 
68% of those sanctioned stated that they had experienced financial hardship as a 
consequence (SSAC, 2006, p. 67). The effect varies primarily depending on the extent to 
which those sanctioned had access to hardship funds or alternative forms of financial 
support. Sanctions had most impact on individuals who were themselves parents, on 
those who were living alone without access to informal sources of support, or those who 
were dealing with difficult personal issues, such as debt, homelessness or drug 
dependency.  
 
Studies of NDYP sanctions have interviewed those working with young people, 
especially PAs. Some of these were concerned that the threat of sanctions could result in 
young people embarking on option placements that were not appropriate for them or that 
they had little interest in pursuing, which was believed to be counterproductive.  PAs 
were also critical about the processes involved. They reported that sanctioning processes 
were administratively complex and hard to implement. There was variation between PAs 
in the nature of decisions referred for adjudication in cases of non-compliance resulting 
in variation in the application of the rules. PAs generally thought sanctions were too blunt 
an instrument and there was some concern that for groups, such as those with chaotic 
lifestyles, such penalties might intensify social exclusion (Finn, 2003) 
 
6.8 Implementation Research and the New Deals 
 
The formative years of JCP have been characterised by front line administrative pressure 
and some delivery failures. The scale, complexity and pace of change has been intense 
with the roles and responsibilities of staff and their relationships with individual 
claimants being redefined through revised job descriptions, target regimes and changes in 
the structure of offices and the use of new technologies. In a major progress review the 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee reported that it had received 
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evidence “that change planning has been poor, with management across the country 
struggling to try to keep up with, and solve problems caused by, the myriad of IT, 
staffing, process, telephony and financial programmes which are all underway at the 
same time” (W&PSC, 2006, p. 3). It is too early to assess the extent to which current 
problems with delivery and staff motivation reflect the pains of organisational transition 
or whether they point to more systemic problems, but they highlight the potential for 
‘implementation gaps’ to emerge. 
 
Many studies of the design and impacts of British ‘welfare to work’ reforms 
acknowledge the significance of implementation but few have examined how policy 
reforms are mediated through the local strategies and work cultures of front-line staff and 
their managers. Those studies undertaken consist of small scale surveys and qualitative 
case studies. They report the different ways in which PAs and other front line staff use 
administrative discretion to negotiate performance targets, categorise and service clients 
and impose sanctions (see, e.g., Blackmore 2001; Wright 2003; Finn 2003; Rosenthal and 
Peccei, 2004). It is at this level. these studies suggest, that the new ‘social contract’ may 
for some be experienced as pressure to cease claiming benefits, participate in 
inappropriate programmes, or  take whatever low paid job is available. 
 
6.9 The Impact of Activation Policies on Individual Rights  
The British tradition has been to avoid statements of principle in legislation as to the 
predominance of fundamental human rights. This phenomenon which is not confined to 
the field of social security makes it difficult to assess the extent to which human rights 
have been implemented in the British system of social security. There are no domestic 
constitutional standards by which to assess such compliance. For example, domestic law 
does not recognise a right to housing nor a right to work. Instead, the structure of the 
benefit system and social security provision has been driven primarily by legislative and 
administrative factors. The fact that the unwritten British constitution does not give 
priority to certain fundamental human rights means that such rights have not been an 
obstacle to the ongoing reforms of the social security system.  European law has played 
only a relatively insignificant role in the evolution of British social security, with the 
notable exception of the equal treatment of men and women and directives that impact on 
working conditions.    
 
The shift towards means-tested benefits has contributed significantly to increased 
complexity in the social security system. Means-tested benefits and their attendant legal 
structure are, by their very nature, very elaborate because they must distinguish between 
diverse sets of personal circumstances and needs. Factors such as age, state of health, 
level of disability, family caring responsibilities, participation in education, part time 
employment, etc., may all be considered relevant to the level of a claimant’s financial 
needs, whereas income and other financial resources considered to be available to a 
household to meet their needs must also be carefully defined. 
 
There are various discretion-based procedural judgments and decisions that officers are 
called upon to make, such as whether a person’s reasons for failing to attend a job 
interview are legitimate and preclude withdrawal of benefit. Complexity presents 
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difficulties both for those who administer social security and for persons who may seek to 
establish entitlement to one or more of the benefits and it also hinders the process of 
claiming benefits. Often a considerable amount of information will need to be supplied 
by the claimant when making a claim. 
 
Generally, the impact of institutional constraints for policy making is eminent. 
Constitutional barriers may impede reforms like in Germany but they may also protect 
the rights of the individual. By contrast, the lack of vested interests in social security 
combined with the political and constitutional system enables relatively straightforward 
policy formulation and implementation in GB. Although the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty no longer corresponds to the complex actual nature of the 
British constitution, questions about the protection of fundamental rights in courts have 
been debated in terms of rights versus parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
In 1998 New Labour incorporated the fundamental rights contained in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law through the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act (HRA) in October 2000. Since then, there have been appeals for the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights to be incorporated into 
British law. Though ECHR rights did not become genuine rights in English law they 
were given domestic effect as laid down under the HRA by making it unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with ECHR. Public power will be 
constrained by courts and tribunals in circumstances where it impinges unjustifiably on 
those rights and whenever it falls short of principles of proportionality and non-
discrimination. Following the HRA, all courts and tribunals must ensure that British 
primary and secondary legislation is compatible with the ECHR rights and the legislation 
contains provisions which authorise a court to grant remedy if a proposed act by a public 
authority is unlawful. In essence therefore, the HRA has created a new course of action, 
which can establish a claim for remedy, including damages against a public authority 
which has acted in breach of the ECHR rights. 
 
Furthermore, the ‘Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights’ is responsible for 
scrutinising all legislation for conformity with all human rights treaties to which GB is 
signatory, including the ECHR. State parties have been held liable for breach of a 
positive duty in Article 3 ECHR to provide conditions of human existence, which are 
consistent with fundamental human dignity. Courts may confront government 
increasingly not only where the fundamental rights of individuals living at the margins of 
human existence are at stake, but also where fundamental freedoms which lie at the very 
heart of the ECHR are at issue.  However, debate about the place for due reference and 
the manner in which the ECHR should be applied under the HRA is ongoing.  
 
There is no legal principle in British law by which courts are prevented from intervening 
in politically sensitive disputes involving, for instance, issues of resource allocation. Lack 
of constitutional propriety, procedural limitations, or sensitivity to the problems of public 
authorities and administrators, however, have been used to justify or explain the refusal 
of courts to intervene in social welfare. In the past courts generally have paid only little 
attention to countervailing fundamental rights, particularly in disputes where the 
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reasonableness of the exercise of discretionary powers is at issue. While socio-economic 
rights are for the most part protected only through legislation, the HRA has afforded 
opportunities to hold government to account for limitations or gaps in legislative 
protection. So far, however, there has been deference in the way in which courts have 
responded to their HRA obligations.   
 
7 Conclusions and Outlook  
 
The Beveridge welfare state established in the 1940s came into crisis in the 1970s as its 
costs escalated and its design limitations were exposed. The Conservative era of neo-
liberal reforms included dismantling core elements of the earlier system, a shift from 
insurance to means-tested benefits, institutional change, and deregulation of the labour 
market. When JSA was introduced in 1996 the benefit regime for ‘jobseekers’ was 
characterised by reduced levels of out of work benefit, increased work tests, harsher 
sanctions and mandatory work first employment programmes. As the economy recovered 
from the early 1990s the number claiming JSA fell but with this legacy came increased 
levels of poverty, both in and out of work, and an expanding population of working age 
people claiming ‘inactive’ benefits, some of whom did so as a consequence of or as an 
alternative to engagement with the stricter benefit regime. 
 
In 1997 New Labour came into power proclaiming its ‘third way’ for combining 
economic efficiency, labour market flexibility and social justice. For the Government 
work represented ‘the best route out of poverty’ and employment became the central 
feature of provision for people of working age. New Deal employment programmes and 
‘make work pay’ policies were implemented swiftly; the JSA regime consolidated; and 
WFIs extended to all working age claimants. The focus of the British activation strategy 
has been on administrative reform and the redesign of front line interactions in order to 
‘activate’ job search behaviour and assist with transitions into paid work. Labour market 
programmes play a much smaller role than in other European countries but expenditure 
on the New Deals and related programmes has increased. Most of the programmes are 
now delivered by external contractors and there has been increased experimentation in 
the delivery of employment assistance, especially through the creation of EZs.  
 
In 2007, ten years after New Labour was first elected, the Government published an 
independent review that points the direction of likely reform over the next decade. The 
‘Freud Report’ proposes that in the future JCP should continue to provide a basic 
intensive work first regime. JSA claimants who remain on benefit and other ‘inactive’ 
groups should, however, be catered for by contracted out providers (Freud, 2007). Under 
these proposals existing categorical programmes would be phased out to be replaced by a 
new quasi market where a small number of competing private and voluntary sector 
providers become responsible for intensive case management and for providing 
individual, tailored help for individuals to re-engage with the labour market. These 
providers would be offered long term contracts and be paid according to sustained job 
outcomes and in relation to the amount of benefit payments saved by the state. As such 
assistance becomes available the level of conditionality would increase. Lone parents will 
initially be subject to actively seeking work requirements when their youngest child is 
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aged 12 and those currently on IB should gradually be subject to the level of 
conditionality that is being introduced for ESA claimants. 
 
The proposals were welcomed by Prime Minister Blair and his successor, Gordon Brown. 
The new Prime Minister promised to ‘champion’ the reforms set out in the ‘Freud report’ 
and that they represented the “first stage in the next decade of welfare reform” (Grice, 
2007). DWP has introduced internal reforms to develop its capacity to design and manage 
the contracts envisaged in the proposals and the changes will be piloted in 2008 with 
further implementation contingent on their progress. The main opposition parties have 
signalled support for these proposals and resistance to this ‘direction of travel’ is likely to 
come from a relatively weak coalition of ‘back bench’ Labour MPs, public sector trade 
unions and welfare rights groups. 
 
The evidence in this chapter suggests that the British combination of activation, New 
Deal programmes, ‘make work pay’, and personalised employment assistance, has 
contributed to reductions in long term unemployment and poverty reduction but problems 
remain.  
 
Out of work benefit levels remain linked to price increases and as wages have increased 
the relative value of benefits to earnings for people without children has continued on the 
downward trend that New Labour inherited. This has increased financial work incentives 
for single claimants and many childless couples but at the cost of relative increased 
poverty. The situation for families with children is far more complex. The combination of 
wider changes in wages and rent levels with increased child benefits for those both in and 
out of work alongside the introduction of the tax credit system mean that on average 
work incentives have weakened since 2000 (Adam et al, 2006).  More than two million 
working adults in Britain now face EMTRs of over 50%. These trends illustrate the 
tension that exists between the Government’s policy of providing more financial support 
directly to poor families and its ambition of getting them into work and, once in 
employment, to make progress and earn more. One response has been the introduction of 
targeted time-limited ‘return to work credits’ that supplement existing tax credits for 
those who are eligible. The other is to increase conditionality and provide enhanced 
employment services that will enable those in work to both retain jobs and improve their 
skills. 
 
The second set of issues concern implementation. The ‘welfare to work’ delivery system 
has been under pressure and is likely to have to adjust to further radical change. There is 
in the short term likely to be disruption to providers and industrial relations conflict in 
JCP as the ‘managed welfare market’ envisaged in the Freud review is introduced. This 
will be followed by a steep learning curve as DWP officials seek to steer the welfare to 
work system through contracts that aim to give greater flexibility and incentives to 
providers yet at the same time prevent the ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ associated with the 
creation of such a quasi market in Australia (Considine, 2005). At the same time the 
Government intends implementing the proposals of the ‘Leitch’ review of skills and 
training that recommended ‘joining up’ the ‘employment first’ system with employer 
based training to improve the skills of those without work, improve retention and create 
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pathways to better quality jobs (HMT 2006).  This ambition is laudable but unlikely to be 
realised without significant change to the ‘work first’ priorities embedded in the 
activation regime and to the qualification based targets that drive the learning and skills 
sector.  
 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the balance of ‘rights and responsibilities’ in the new 
British model of social citizenship. There has been a strong policy emphasis on 
individual’s responsibility to support themselves and their family through employment, 
so that the right to welfare on the basis of need is balanced against their responsibility to 
work. British jobseekers now face one of the most demanding activation regimes in 
Europe, with elements of this approach being extended to lone parents and those with 
health conditions and disabilities, accompanied with new levels of administrative and 
bureaucratic discretion. In this context the checks and balances that exist in national and 
European law may need reform to both reduce the arbitrary and unfair exercise of the 
authority of the state and ensure that new ‘active’ citizenship rights are more than rhetoric 
and that vulnerable people are not denied access to the financial support and services they 
need. 
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